

Limiting Liberalism: The Southern Veto in Congress, 1933–1950

IRA KATZNELSON
KIM GEIGER
DANIEL KRYDER

Richard Hofstadter concluded his 1949 assessment of the previous year's Dixiecrat revolt with the claim that the Democratic party "finds itself in the anomalous position of being a party of 'liberalism,' whose achievements are subject to veto by a reactionary fraction."¹ The same year, V. O. Key published the landmark study, *Southern Politics*. His chapters on "Solidarity in the Senate" and "The South in the House" remain the best starting point for considering Hofstadter's claim. Key's questions were these: "Is the South actually united in Congress? If so, on what issues? We have the popular characterization of the South as 'reactionary' and as 'conservative.' Does the record support such epithets?"² Aside from controversies about race, he answered in the negative. Who was right, Hofstadter or Key?

Much is at stake in adjudicating these claims. Southern political elites con-

¹ Richard Hofstadter, "From Calhoun to the Dixiecrats," *Social Research* 16 (June 1949): 150.

² V. O. Key, Jr. with the assistance of Alexander Heard, *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Knopf, 1949), 346.

IRA KATZNELSON is Loeb Professor of Political Science and Social Science at the New School for Social Research. KIM GEIGER is a Ph.D. candidate at the New School, currently completing a dissertation on the origins and implications of the GI bill. DANIEL KRYDER is an assistant professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, working on racial conflict and wartime mobilization in the 1940s.

trolled the national Democratic party from the debacle of 1896 to the start of the New Deal.³ While Democrats managed to obtain only about 40 percent of the popular vote in congressional and presidential contests outside the South in this period, within the region votes for Democrats never fell below 86 percent.⁴ As a result, some two in three Democratic members of Congress were southerners who stood on a common platform devoted to the preservation of the southern racial order and the adjustment of gross interregional inequalities.⁵ The Democratic party's landslide victories in 1932, 1934, and 1936 converted it from a regional to a genuinely national force and remade it into an instrument of governance. For the first time since the demise of the Knights of Labor, an agrarian-industrial alliance that could effectively challenge the prerogatives of capital became a possibility, but not without immense risks for the South's segregated racial civilization. Now a minority faction in a majority party, the South no longer defined the party's policy agenda. The election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the emergence of a strong nonsouthern Democratic bloc of consequence in Congress forced southern representatives to embark on a great balancing act that sought at once to secure the party's new majority, enhance national state capacity to aid southern economic development, and protect white privilege. What was not clear was whether these goals could be advanced simultaneously.

Notwithstanding the altered situation of the South, the region remained well placed to defend the interests of its economic and political elites. During the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, southerners never composed less than 40 percent of the Democrats in Congress and they chaired approximately half

³ Defining the South is not a straightforward matter. For obvious reasons, many historians and social scientists, including V. O. Key, treat the South as consisting of the eleven ex-Confederate states (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia). The Census Bureau defines the South as these eleven states plus five more—Delaware, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Maryland, and West Virginia, as well as the District of Columbia. We treat the South as the ex-Confederate states plus Kentucky and Oklahoma for two reasons. First, this usage was in vogue during the 1930s and 1940s, as, for example, in the most important New Deal study of the region (U.S. National Emergency Council, *Report on Economic Conditions of the South* [Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938]). Second, *The Congressional Quarterly Almanac* uses this thirteen-state demarcation, and it has become the standard for most congressional studies. By adopting this definition, we slightly bias our material in the direction of softening regional differences in congressional voting.

⁴ For data on election returns and discussion of the role of southern Democrats in Congress, see David Brady, *Critical Elections and Congressional Policy Making* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988); and Barbara Sinclair, *Congressional Realignment, 1925–1978* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983), especially the useful table on regional composition on p. 19.

⁵ A thoughtful discussion can be found in Erik N. Olssen, "Southern Senators and Reform Issues in the 1920's: A Paradox Unraveled" in Bruce Clayton and John A. Salmond, eds., *The South is Another Land: Essays on the Twentieth Century South* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987). Also see David Burner, *The Politics of Provincialism: The Democratic Party in Transition, 1918–1932* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), esp. chap. vi.

the committees.⁶ Their most impressive resource was the rock solid stability of regional representation. Between 1933 and 1952 there never were fewer than 115 southern Democrats in the House, yet never more than 118; by contrast, the nonsouthern Democratic cohort ranged from 217 in 1937 to just 73 members in 1947. Thus, even at the height of the New Deal, the Democratic party required the acquiescence of southern representatives, who as potential coalition partners for Republicans could, if they chose, block the national program. After the electoral shifts to the Republicans in the 1942 and 1946 congressional elections, the South even more clearly commanded veto power over Democratic party initiatives. Moreover, the filibuster in the Senate and control of the Rules Committee in the House provided a set of institutional filters for determined southerners bent on obstructing the Democratic party's majority preferences.⁷

Liberal initiatives, in short, could not pass without southern congressional support. Which measures survived this test? Which did not? Did southern policy inclinations change during the course of the 1930s and 1940s? By reconsidering the southern veto in Congress, we can trace the implications of the hybrid regional qualities of the Democratic party for the policy content and limits of American liberalism at the pivotal moment in the making of the modern Democratic party.

The touchstone of our analysis is Key's *Southern Politics*. The section titled "Political Leadership: The One-Party System in the Nation," which probes the "legend" of southern solidarity, analyzes 873 congressional votes: 598 Senate and 275 House roll calls.⁸ "Perhaps," he mused at the outset of his consideration, ". . . the legislative record would show that southern solidarity contains elements other than a dominant attitude toward the Negro?" But he concluded otherwise: "In an earlier day perhaps a common interest in the tariff cemented southern states together in national affairs; nowadays — apart from the indubitably potent habit of voting Democratic — about all that remains to promote southern solidarity is the Negro."⁹

We find otherwise. Southern Democrats, we show, did not split with their party only on civil rights votes. In spite of their willingness to support an assertive role for the national state in economic affairs with approximately the same degree of enthusiasm as nonsouthern Democrats, southern members also broke ranks on labor-centered questions — whether to facilitate the establishment of a genuinely

⁶ Between 1933 and 1952, southern Democrats commanded 48 percent of the chairmanships and ranking minority positions in the Senate, and 51 percent in the House. See Brady, *Critical Elections*.

⁷ An excellent summary discussion can be found in Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, *Democracy and the American Party System* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), chap. 8.

⁸ Key, *Southern Politics*, 315, 346. For the Senate, Key included virtually all the votes cast during the seven odd year sessions between 1933 and 1945 (that is, he skipped every other year); for the House, he analyzed almost all the roll calls in the four House sessions of 1933, 1937, 1941, and 1945. He excluded votes that were nearly unanimous, when those who dissented constituted no more than 10 percent of the majority, as well as votes for the election of the president pro tempore of the Senate.

⁹ Key, *Southern Politics*, 345, 315.

national labor market and create a favorable climate for trade union organization. This policy schism became more pronounced during the course of the 1940s when union mobilization threatened to undermine the relationship between labor markets and race relations in the South. The division between southern and nonsouthern Democrats on labor questions occurred at the crucial time when the character of post-New Deal liberalism was being shaped in a complex negotiation between conflicting interests and ideologies within the Democratic party. The content and timing of the southern veto on labor issues, we argue, played a central role in establishing post-New Deal liberalism's qualities and limits.

Unfortunately, methodological decisions taken by Key and other students of congressional issue voting have obscured the complex association between race and labor in the Democratic party and its effects on the formation of congressional policy coalitions during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. By taking a fresh look at this historical record, we demonstrate the emergence during the 1940s of three distinctive alliances: a bipartisan civil rights coalition linking nonsouthern Democrats and Republicans; a party-based liberal coalition joining nonsouthern and southern democrats on welfare state, fiscal, regulatory, and planning issues; and a cross-party conservative coalition coupling southern Democrats and Republicans in the single area of labor policy. Like Key, we locate race at the center of the distinctive regional interest of the South; but unlike Key, we discover a pattern in the legislative record that points to a vital, but underexposed imbrication of the issues of race and labor.

STUDYING THE SOUTHERN VETO

To pursue this inquiry, we have analyzed eighty-nine Senate and sixty-one House roll calls between 1933 and 1950 concerned with civil rights, planning, regulation, fiscal policy, the welfare state, and labor. We focus on these areas to evaluate Key's assertion that the southern veto was limited to racial questions and Hofstadter's contention that southern obstruction vitiated the more social democratic aspects of the New Deal. Throughout, we compare the voting behavior of southern Democrats, nonsouthern Democrats, and Republicans. To discover patterns of change, we also subdivide this period into the three sets of New Deal, wartime, and postwar Congresses. Unlike most studies of Congress, we have combined our Senate and House roll calls into a single data set of 150 votes. Our focus is on sectional solidarity and the role of the southern Democratic party faction rather than on institutional differences between the legislative chambers, and our units of analysis are votes by members of the three blocs in specific policy domains.¹⁰

¹⁰ Of course, Congress is not a single institutional location; members either are senators or representatives whose votes are shaped by the size and character of constituencies, party discipline, and each institution's norms and procedures. We have examined Senate and House votes to see whether we are justified in combining the roll calls from each chamber. On the various measures we report

Congressional policy studies depend on the identification of a universe of votes and their placement in issue categories. With respect to selection, we proceeded inductively by reviewing all the roll calls between the 73rd (1933–1935) and 81st (1949–1951) Congresses to choose the most significant bills and amendments. We did not set the threshold so high so as to include only landmark legislation; neither did we set it so low to include the trivial or merely procedural. Rather than adopt an inclusive strategy that makes no distinction between more and less important roll calls or apply a threshold test of significance,¹¹ we winnowed our universe by judging the content of proposed legislation. Our aim has been to discover the substantive bases for controversy, stress, and the appearance of coalitions by searching the relevant roll calls irrespective of their outcome.

Categorization matters. For the past two decades, the most influential classification for congressional policy voting has been that of Aage Clausen, who divided congressional roll calls into five categories, of which three are directly relevant to this paper: government management of the economy, social welfare, and civil liberties.¹² This classification has been widely adopted.¹³ Unfortunately, its overaggregation obscures critical variations because it joins together policy areas about which there should be no a priori assumption of covariance.

We have partitioned Clausen's groupings into more specific and coherent components to reflect alternative policy tools more accurately. For his single government management category, we have substituted the policy areas of planning, regulation, and fiscal policy.¹⁴ Likewise, we have separated welfare state and labor votes, which Clausen combined under the rubric of social welfare. Finally,

below, the results are sufficiently similar that it would be redundant to report them separately. The most significant differences are a more left-liberal tilt to southern voting in the Senate on labor and civil rights questions and in the House on fiscal, planning, regulation, and welfare state issues.

¹¹ For examples, see William H. Riker, "A Method for Determining the Significance of Roll Calls in Voting Bodies" in John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau, eds., *Legislative Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1959), 377–384; Richard Franklin Bensel, *Sectionalism and American Political Development, 1880–1980* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), 31–38; and Key, *Southern Politics*, chaps. 16 and 17.

¹² Aage R. Clausen, *How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973).

¹³ Often, even in important studies, the usage of his categories has been remarkably unreflective. Examples include Sinclair, *Congressional Realignment*; Mack C. Shelly II, *The Permanent Majority: The Conservative Coalition in the United States Congress* (University: University of Alabama Press, 1983); Herbert B. Asher and Herbert F. Weisberg, "Voting Change in Congress: Some Dynamic Perspectives on an Evolutionary Process," *American Journal of Political Science* 22 (May 1978); and Mary Alice Nye, "The U.S. Senate and Civil Rights Roll-Call Votes," *Western Political Quarterly* 44 (December 1991).

¹⁴ Politicians and state managers plan when they purposefully direct and combine capital, land, and labor with the view that self-interested decisions taken by private actors alone cannot benefit the collective interest. Regulations set standards and enforce conduct in industries and markets. Fiscal interventions "turn on the financial taps and regulate the flow while leaving the response contingent upon the autonomous and self-interested decisions of private actors." Ronald King, "Wartime and Postwar Economic Planning in the United States" (Unpublished manuscript, 1984).

we distinguish among votes on race relations, civil liberties, and internal security, which Clausen lumped together under the heading of civil liberties. Here, we focus exclusively on those votes from this domain that concern civil rights for blacks.

In sum, we probe the southern veto by inspecting congressional behavior in the policy areas of planning, regulation, fiscal policy, the welfare state, labor, and civil rights. In each, we trace the voting patterns for southern Democrats, nonsouthern Democrats, and Republicans to investigate the following puzzles:

How solid was the South? To assess the degree of bonding of southern representatives as a voting bloc, we score the roll calls by making use of the index of cohesion first proposed by Stuart Rice and adopted by V. O. Key in his discussion of southern solidarity.¹⁵ We find that southern Democrats were characterized by high intragroup cohesion; so, however, were the other two blocs of nonsouthern Democrats and Republicans. The most cohesive bloc, in fact, was not the solid South, but the Democratic solid north. The relatively low cohesion score for southern Democrats is accounted for almost entirely by significant splits among southerners on labor issues.

How "reactionary" was the South? To probe this question we first trace the percentages of votes cast by members of the three blocs for the liberal position in each policy area (which we identify as the Roosevelt or Truman administration's stance). Apart from civil rights and labor questions, we find that southern and nonsouthern Democratic voting behavior was virtually indistinguishable. We also ascertain similarities and differences between the three voting blocs of nonsouthern Democrats and southern Democrats, southern Democrats and Republicans, and nonsouthern Democrats and Republicans in the discrete issue domains by applying Rice's index of likeness, a measure of the degree to which any two voting blocs behave similarly on a given vote.¹⁶ On this basis, we are able to identify highly distinctive civil rights, liberal, and conservative coalitions, with the latter limited to the policy domain of labor.

How did the Democratic congressional coalition change over time, and why? To find out, we have organized our data not only by region and party, but by period. We have partitioned the roll calls from the 73rd Congress through the 81st into New Deal, wartime, and postwar spans of three Congresses each, cov-

¹⁵ This index provides a measure of the cohesiveness of a given bloc by tallying the difference between the percentage of affirmative votes and the percentage of negative votes within the group. Unanimity is tallied as 100; an even split as zero. Rice's measure of cohesion was first proposed in Stuart A. Rice, "The Behavior of Legislative Groups: A Method of Measurement," *Political Science Quarterly* 40 (March 1925); and elaborated in his *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1928). They are usefully discussed in Duncan MacRae, Jr., *Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting: Methods of Statistical Analysis* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 179–82.

¹⁶ A likeness score is arrived at by subtracting from 100 the difference between the percentages of positive votes that are cast by each bloc. This measure was also first developed by Stuart A. Rice, "The Behavior of Legislative Groups: A Method of Measurement"; and elaborated in his *Quantitative Methods in Politics*.

ering 1933–1939, 1939–1945, and 1945–1951. This analysis proves revealing. The civil rights and liberal alliances remained durable throughout, but an anti-labor conservative coalition appeared for the first time in the wartime congresses. We shall see that during the heyday of the New Deal, southern Democrats were inclined to support the administration's major labor-related initiatives, albeit with reservations and only after they secured protection for their regional interests. During the war and postwar Congresses, however, there was a decided southern tilt against trade unions and attempts to organize a national labor market. As a result, the liberal coalition was precluded from broadening into a social democratic alliance.

We have approached this analysis with caution; so should the reader. Each roll call is treated as an equivalent unit; this, of course, is an artificial imposition that flattens the vastly different significance of individual votes. Further, much of the substantive legislative work took place in committees, beyond this article's ken. This point cuts two ways. On the one hand, southern control over the agenda in key committees created a bias in favor of cross-region roll call consensus, for the bills that came to the floor often had been tailored to accommodate regional interests. As a result, our discussion risks exaggerating southern left-wing propensities. On the other hand, precisely because southerners possessed the capacity to shape a good deal of legislation at the committee stage, the issue areas where Democratic cohesion failed to hold are even more noteworthy.¹⁷

THE SOLID SOUTH

“Just how ‘solid’ is the ‘Solid South?’” V. O. Key posed this question as the first step in a quest to discover the essentials of southern unity by identifying “those issues clothed with a compulsion toward solidarity.” He discovered, by a small margin, that the average cohesiveness of southerners was higher than that of Republicans, nonsouthern Democrats, or all Democrats combined.¹⁸ Applying Rice’s index of cohesion, Key found southern Democratic senators to have had an average cohesion score of 60; nonsouthern Democrats, 52; and Republicans, 56.¹⁹

We utilize the same measure of cohesion. Recall that we focus on civil rights plus what might be called the core of the social democratic agenda: votes on

¹⁷ The committee system, we further note, was a very porous filter. Substantial amending activity continually forced Democrats to confront potentially divisive issues on the floor and challenged southerners to defeat again measures that already had been eliminated at the committee stage. For a tightly reasoned discussion of how congressional committees shape and constrain the policy agenda, see James M. Snyder, Jr., “Committee Power, Structure-Induced Equilibria, and Roll Call Votes,” *American Journal of Political Science* 36 (February 1992).

¹⁸ Key, *Southern Politics*, 346–347, 348, 370.

¹⁹ Key treats Senate and House votes in separate chapters. We have recalculated his data to combine his roll calls into a single data set in which we have given equal weight to each vote.

TABLE 1

Congressional Bloc Solidarity, 1933–1950: Index of Cohesion Scores of 70 and Above^a

Votes (N)	<i>Southern Democrats</i>	<i>Nonsouthern Democrats</i>	<i>Republicans</i>
All (150)	45%	55%	45%
Non-civil rights (121)	40	58	41
V. O. Key's <i>Southern Politics</i> (873) ^b	45	30	39

^a Index of cohesion measures the difference between the percentage of affirmative votes and the percentage of negative votes within the bloc.

^b The period covered by this book is 1933–1945. For a discussion of Key's data set, see footnote 8.

alternative ways to structure the relationship between political authority and markets in capital and labor. On this set of issues so central to the qualities of Democratic party liberalism, our findings differ in a number of significant ways from Key's. We, too, detect three internally cohesive voting blocs, but their ordering is dissimilar. Southern Democrats recorded a cohesion score, 60, identical to the one reported by Key. Republicans scored 62. Our unforeseen result concerns nonsouthern Democrats, who proved the most cohesive group, with a score of 67.²⁰ At the core of the social democratic reform agenda, the standard representation of a solid South must be supplemented by an even more valid image of a united Democratic nonsouth.

Key was not content with overall cohesion scores; neither are we. With his summary findings in hand, he utilized his data to ask how often each of the blocs voted with cohesion above a threshold score of 70 (that is, one that reflected a positive or negative vote of 85 percent or more), and he sought to discover the properties of these highly solid votes. Applying this measure, he found the gap between southern and nonsouthern Democrats to be greater than that indicated by mean cohesion scores. Key's southern Democrats displayed very high togetherness 45 percent of the time, compared to just 30 percent for the nonsouthern Democrats, and 39 percent of the Republicans.²¹

Our findings differ. When we apply Key's approach to our six policy areas, we discover that each bloc voted with this level of high cohesion more of the time: 45 percent for southern Democrats, 45 percent for the Republicans, and a considerable 55 percent for the nonsouthern Democrats. Moreover, when we exclude the civil rights category to focus exclusively on the state-economy votes at the core of the social democratic agenda, the nonsouthern Democratic frequency

²⁰ These cohesion scores as well as the likeness scores reported give equal weight to each of our six issue areas rather than to each vote. When we exclude civil rights and only consider votes that directly concern government-market relationships, the nonsouthern Democratic score rises to 69 while that of the southern Democrats falls to 56 and the Republicans drop to 60.

²¹ These figures represent the results we obtained when we combined Key's House and Senate votes into one data set, counting each vote equally. Key, *Southern Politics*, 370.

increases to 58 percent. In short, we have identified issues in which high cohesion voting was more common than usual; these policy votes united nonsouthern Democrats to an uncustomary extent. It seems reasonable to conclude that throughout the 1930s and 1940s, these Democrats constituted a steady core of support for social democratic policies. Thus, the fate of such initiatives depended on two factors: the relative size of this cohort and their capacity to find allies outside their ranks, especially in the southern wing of the party. Indeed, as the the nonsouthern Democratic bloc contracted in size as a result of significant electoral setbacks in the 1942 and especially in the 1946 congressional elections, the structural privileges of the South as a one-party unit within the Democratic party became increasingly significant.

Key examined more closely those Senate votes where southern Democratic cohesion was exceptionally high and in opposition both to their Democratic colleagues and to the Republicans.²² He found only nine of 598 Senate roll calls that met this test to represent “southern solidarity in its most extreme form.” Of these, seven were civil rights votes. The other two concerned whether the Works Progress Administration should pay locally prevailing wage rates. Key concluded that this quite small number of issues “on which the South stands solidly against both Republicans and nonsouthern Democrats . . . reflect[s] a common determination to oppose external intervention in matters of race relations.”²³

Unfortunately, Key did not examine votes characterized by unusually low southern cohesion, yet these departures from the norm are equally instructive: when was the Dixie bloc most divided? In order to see where the South was fragmented, we have applied the threshold test of a cohesion score of 70 to each issue area. Not surprisingly, we too find that high southern Democratic cohesion was most frequent on civil rights votes. In this policy domain, southern representatives achieved very high solidarity 69 percent of the time. However, in no other policy area did the southerners match the nonsouthern Democrats’ high solidarity. Southern Democrats proved significantly less united than the non-southern Democrats in all areas but civil rights, and least united of all on labor questions, voting cohesively at the 70 plus level least often on questions that concerned unions and labor markets. This outlier status demands explanation just as much as the civil rights votes to which Key devotes so much attention.

Because Key searched exclusively for evidence of southern solidarity, the region’s low cohesion on labor issues escaped his gaze. The relative lack of southern togetherness in this policy area indicates significant cross-pressure of party and constituency. Southern Democrats initially had no interest in supporting the pro-business, anti-labor impulse of most Republicans. They understood that labor issues were terribly important for the national party, and many southern

²² Key, *Southern Politics*, 349–55.

²³ *Ibid.*, 351–52. Key notes that “it is conceivable that in their opposition southern senators were moved by race considerations: Negroes on the WPA were thought to be receiving too much money.”

TABLE 2

Policy Area Bloc Solidarity, 1933–1950: Index of Cohesion Scores of 70 and Above

<i>Policy (N)</i>	<i>Southern Democrats</i>	<i>Nonsouthern Democrats</i>	<i>Republicans</i>
Civil rights (29)	69%	41%	62%
Fiscal (11)	45	73	55
Planning (27)	59	70	44
Regulation (22)	36	41	45
Welfare state (24)	42	50	46
Labor (37)	24	59	30
All votes (150)	45	55	45

representatives, like other members of the party, resented business resistance to New Deal and Fair Deal initiatives. At the same time, the growth and extension of unions and ongoing efforts to nationalize labor markets posed very significant challenges to the South. If, as Gavin Wright argues, all the distinguishing differences between the South and the rest of the United States—racial segregation, low wage rates, farming methods, and the region's political economy—"have their roots in the separateness of the southern labor market,"²⁴ then southern representatives had to weigh their interest in a successful Democratic party coalition against threats to the integrity of that insular market.

WAS THE SOUTH A REACTIONARY FACTION?

We first explore this question by examining the percentage of votes cast by southerners in favor of planning, regulation, expansive fiscal policies, welfare state programs, a national labor market and union prerogatives, and civil rights. In the first four of these policy domains the southern bloc proved nearly as supportive as nonsouthern Democrats. Not only was there no southern veto, the South voted by large margins to expand the role of the national state in economic affairs and to redress existing patterns of economic distribution in the direction of more equality. At the same time, southern congressional Democrats sought to restrict the political and economic capacities of two of the most important have-not groups in American life—African-Americans and the working class.

In light of the South's long history of asserting the rights of states against Washington, we had anticipated that southern Democrats would be much less inclined to favor planning proposals, because of the powers they confer on bureaucrats, and more inclined to favor business regulation, welfare state programs, or expansive macroeconomic policies. This expectation was not borne out. Southern Democrats backed planning as much or more than the other three types

²⁴ Gavin Wright, *Old South New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil War* (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 8.

TABLE 3
Average Left Bloc Voting by Policy Area, 1933–1950

<i>Policy (N)</i>	<i>Southern Democrats</i>	<i>Nonsouthern Democrats</i>	<i>Republicans</i>
Civil rights (29)	10%	72%	77%
Fiscal (11)	81	87	22
Planning (27)	81	89	32
Regulation (22)	68	77	25
Welfare state (24)	73	84	30
Labor (37)	42	85	26
All votes (150)	54	82	37

of market interventions by the central state. Overall, they voted on the liberal side in these four categories by a mean percentage yes vote of 75 (a level of support close to the nonsouthern Democratic percentage of 84). By contrast, Republicans opposed these measures just about as strongly as southern Democrats endorsed them. Southern antipathy to national state authority focused very specifically on interventions into the region's race relations and labor markets. Otherwise, the region's representatives favored by significant margins virtually all the fiscal, regulatory, planning, and welfare state measures of the New Deal and Fair Deal. If it comes as no surprise that southern Democrats resisted civil rights legislation, it is their anti-labor voting that is most striking.

Bloc voting is coherent, Key rightly insisted, only when it is considered in relationship to the voting patterns of other blocs. To discover how alike the voting patterns were of the three possible bloc pairings in our six issue areas, we utilize Rice's measure of likeness. These scores help us not only to reevaluate the Republican-southern Democratic coalition, but to better identify those policies that united the regional wings of the Democratic party.

Treating each issue area equally, we find that southern Democrats and Republicans possessed a mean likeness score of 53, just four points higher than the likeness score of 49 for non-southern Democrats and Republicans. Southern Democratic and nonsouthern Democratic likeness was very much higher than either of these, with a score of 69. Overall, the wings of the Democratic party displayed relatively high similarity across the divide of region, notwithstanding the conventional claim of a Republican-southern Democratic, conservative coalition.

Our most striking findings result when we identify those policy areas where an overall likeness score of at least 70 appeared. With six policy areas and three voting blocs, there were eighteen such prospects, but only six instances of strong coalition voting. Four of these cases of high likeness joined southern and non-southern Democrats: roll calls concerned with planning, regulation, fiscal issues, and the welfare state.²⁵ The Democratic party voted virtually as a single unit on

²⁵ In fact, the likeness scores were remarkably high, in each case over 80.

TABLE 4

Congressional Coalitions by Policy Area, 1933–1950: Index of Likeness Scores^a

<i>Policy (N)</i>	<i>Southern Democrats and Republicans</i>	<i>Southern Democrats and Nonsouthern Democrats</i>	<i>Nonsouthern Democrats and Republicans</i>
Civil rights (29)	32	38	73
Fiscal (11)	41	89	35
Planning (27)	49	89	42
Regulation (22)	52	87	47
Welfare state (24)	56	82	47
Labor (37)	73	56	39
All votes (150)	53	69	49

^a Index of likeness subtracts from 100 the difference between the percentage of positive votes cast by each bloc.

these state-economy questions; its collective likeness score for these issues was an extraordinary 87. The legislative capacities of this liberal coalition depended on the balance of forces between the major parties.

By contrast, regional splits within the Democratic party took on strategic significance in the two other policy areas of civil rights and labor. Nonsouthern Democrats and Republicans achieved a 70 plus likeness score on race questions, the only issue arena to exhibit this kind of cross-party regional division. Because they could not muster majorities against this civil rights coalition, southerners dealt with their defensive quandary by controlling the legislative agenda and by utilizing the filibuster. Labor votes displayed their own distinctive coalition pattern, marked by high likeness for southern Democrats and Republicans. Over the entire period, the storied conservative coalition was confined to labor roll calls. Especially during the wartime and postwar congresses, this anti-labor coalition was able to make union organization more difficult and inhibit the development of a single national labor market.

In short, congressional voting was characterized by three coalitions—liberal, civil rights, and conservative—each of which was issue specific. In fact, in most of the contests that involved the three factional alignments, southern Democrats were the prevailing faction; their preferences were pivotal to the outcome; and in the single instance where they stood alone against northern Democrats and Republicans, their strategic positions within Congress gave them a series of procedural vetoes. Together, the liberal, conservative, and civil rights coalitions established the congressional foundations for postwar American politics and policy.

Unlike Key, who downplayed the existence of a conservative coalition, Hofstadter did not conduct a study of congressional voting to buttress his claim of a reactionary South. Thus, to provide an empirical surrogate for Hofstadter, we turn to the work of John Robert Moore, who arrived at conclusions similar to Hofstadter's on the basis of empirical research.

In fact, Key and Moore utilize an identical coalitional criterion. Both use a straightforward measure to identify conservative coalition votes as votes when more than half of the Republicans joined more than half of the southern Democrats to oppose the preferences of more than half of nonsouthern Democrats. Key found that just under 10 percent (54) of his Senate votes met the coalitional test. He also applied a more stringent guideline that required at least 70 percent of the southerners to join a majority of Republicans against a majority of nonsouthern Democrats; this measure further reduced the number of coalitional votes to 4 percent (26 roll calls). He utilized not only the low number of such votes but also their character to debunk the notion of a conservative alliance.²⁶

Moore, in turn, argued that Key's inclusive universe of roll calls had the effect of underappreciating the extent and significance of the conservative coalition. Moore hypothesized that a focus on significant roll calls would reveal a higher incidence of coalitional, as opposed to party alignment, voting. To test this claim, he restricted his attention to 182 "significant" votes in the Senate from 1942 through 1945.²⁷ Of these, 24 percent displayed the coalition; and, of these, eight in ten secured Key's threshold of 70 percent southern voting cohesion.²⁸ "The [conservative] coalition," he concluded, "operated most frequently and most effectively on roll calls dealing with states' rights, agricultural interests, regulation of business, social welfare, labor, public works and resources development, taxation, education, and civil rights."²⁹

This claim is very much at odds with our finding that a Republican-southern Democratic alliance appeared on labor questions exclusively.³⁰ We therefore replicated Key's and Moore's test of the stoutness of the coalition; that is, we examined the appearance of majority Republican and southern Democratic voting on the same side of an issue against the opposite voting pattern of the majority of nonsouthern Democrats, both for our universe of 150 roll calls and separately for each policy domain. Our aggregate findings are much closer to Moore's than to Key's: thirty-one roll calls, or 20 percent of our total, qualify as coalitional

²⁶ Key did not break his votes into policy categories. Rather, he claimed conservative coalition votes were a compound of diverse parts in which southern regional interests coincided with Republican preferences. By assimilating labor votes into the more inclusive and less focused category of agrarian interests in order to demonstrate the absence of a planter-big business basis for a conservative coalition, he marginalized the distinctive significance of roll calls on labor issues.

²⁷ John Robert Moore, "The Conservative Coalition in the U.S. Senate, 1942–1945," *The Journal of Southern History* 33 (August 1967). He defined these votes as those that achieved a midpoint score of at least .5 on William Riker's test for determining the significant value of congressional roll calls. Riker's measure identifies the significance of a roll call by a numerical coefficient arrived at from both the degree to which members of Congress participate in a given vote and by the degree to which the vote proves controversial. Riker, "A Method for Determining."

²⁸ When Moore included all the votes in his data set, as did Key, he found that coalition votes appeared 15 percent of the time.

²⁹ Moore, "Conservative Coalition," 375.

³⁰ Moore lists examples of coalition votes, but provides no systematic analysis of the content or frequency of the different issue categories.

TABLE 5
*Southern Democratic-Republican Coalition, 1933–1950:
 Roll Calls with Majorities of Southern Democrats and Republicans in
 Agreement in Opposition to Nonsouthern Democratic Majority*

Policy	New Deal	Wartime	Postwar	All Roll Calls
Civil rights (29)	29% (2)	8% (1)	11% (1)	14% (4)
Fiscal (11)	0	0	14 (1)	9 (1)
Planning (27)	0	0	11 (1)	4 (1)
Regulation (22)	0	0	14 (1)	5 (1)
Welfare state (24)	0	21 (3)	25 (1)	17 (4)
Labor (37)	11 (1)	60 (6)	67 (12)	51 (19)
All votes (150)	7 (3)	20 (10)	31 (17)	20 (30)

votes. Of these, however, nearly two in three (20) were labor votes. The next highest category was the welfare state, where just 16 percent of the votes qualified. Outside the domain of labor, the coalition appeared only 7 percent of the time, which is less frequently than Key found to be the case across his entire universe of roll calls.

The conservative coalition was issue specific. Aside from labor questions, southern representatives did more than reject conservative Republican positions; they joined their nonsouthern colleagues to support much of the party's social democratic agenda with a level of enthusiasm appropriate to a poor region with a heritage of opposition to big business and a history of support for regulation and redistribution. But with their resistance to civil rights, southerners perpetuated a "progressive" coalition that was inherently racist; and their negative tilt on labor questions precluded a social democratic breakthrough for the Democratic party.

FROM A STRUCTURAL TO A BEHAVIORAL VETO

In the 1930s and 1940s, southern representatives possessed a structural veto over Democratic party policy aims. Over the course of the New Deal, wartime, and postwar congresses, their utilization of this potential increased steadily. Just 10 percent of the cases of conservative coalition voting, focusing mainly on labor issues, occurred from the New Deal 73rd through 75th Congresses, 35 percent from the wartime 76th through 78th Congresses, and 55 percent in the postwar 79th through 81st Congresses.³¹ In the first period, just 9 percent of the labor roll calls produced coalitional votes. The proportion of instances increased to 58 percent in the middle period, and jumped further to 67 percent in the postwar Congresses. How might we best describe and understand this dramatic shift?

³¹ During the first span, there were only three instances of coalitional voting, or just 7 percent of all the period's roll calls. The number of such votes jumped to 19 percent (11) in the middle period, and to 31 percent (17) in the last.

With the exception of a small number of visible obstructionists, southern members supported the New Deal's programs to stimulate economic growth and development. In turn, President Roosevelt and congressional leaders tailored New Deal legislation to southern preferences. They reached an implicit modus vivendi: southern civil society would remain intact and southern representatives would support the key elements of the administration's program. There would be no attempt to build a mass biracial base in the South; nor would even the most heinous aspects of regional repression, such as lynching, be brought under the rule of law. Further, sponsors fashioned key bills to avoid disturbing the region's racial civilization by employing two main policy instruments: the exclusion of agricultural and domestic labor, the principal occupational categories of blacks, from legislation, including the National Recovery Act, the Wagner Act, Social Security, and the Fair Labor Standards Act; and decentralized administration.³²

This formula collapsed during the wartime Congresses. Southern pro-labor voting stopped. Southern representatives now joined Republicans to limit the rights of unions and restrict the scope of federal control over labor markets. Two factors account for this shift. First, war mobilization devalued the economic significance of the South. The region had little to offer the war effort at a time when both capital and labor in the North, including black labor, were critically important to military production. Accordingly, southern political elites understood their bargaining position had eroded. Second, wartime labor shortages and military conscription facilitated labor organizing and civil rights agitation. In this more uncertain moment of rapid economic and central state expansion, the South redrew the line between those aspects of the New Deal it would tolerate and those it could not, and it rejected even those arrangements that had permitted the South to vote with the national party in pre-1938 labor votes.

World War II and the role of black soldiers within the American military radically transformed the possibilities for civil rights initiatives by linking them directly to the imperatives and demands of national citizenship. As the war raged in Europe, in August 1940, some seventeen months before Pearl Harbor, Senator Robert Wagner of New York proposed to amend the enlistment section of the Selective Compulsory Service Act by prohibiting discrimination based on race, creed, or color. Apart from the South, Wagner's amendment secured virtually unanimous support. Two years later in August 1942, Congress took up the question of voting by members of the armed forces. The Senate considered two

³² In 1930, 26 percent of all American workers and 51 percent of black workers labored in agriculture or domestic employment. The respective figures for the South (limited, in this instance, to the eleven states of the Confederacy) were 48 percent and 62 percent. Thus, it is clear that there was an important class as well as racial bias signaled by these exclusions from the purview of the New Deal's key legislative enactments. Detailed state-by-state data based on the 1930 Census appears in Robert C. Lieberman, "Race and the Organization of Social Policy" (Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1992).

amendments to a bill that provided for armed forces absentee voting. Aiming at the southern white primary system, the first of these amendments, proposed by a Connecticut Republican, John Danaher, proposed to extend its provisions to primary elections. The second, sponsored by Illinois Republican C. Wayland Brooks, sought to eliminate the poll tax from absentee voting. As in the Selective Service debate, in both of these instances southern opposition (8 of the 11 present voted no on the primary and 9 of 11 on the poll tax) was overcome to produce majorities for passage (28-25 for the Danaher amendment and 33-20 for the Brooks amendment). Likewise in the House in October 1942, southern opposition (76-14) to a bill to outlaw the requirement of a poll tax as a prerequisite for voting or registering to vote in federal elections was overwhelmed by the rest of the House, as the southerners who voted negatively were joined by only four other Democrats and four Republicans. The bill's supporters treated it as wartime legislation intended to prevent the disunity of citizens at a time of crisis. By contrast, most southerners saw it as an indirect attempt to transform the character of southern representation and the racial civilization of the South itself. While the bill subsequently failed to overcome a filibuster in the Senate, its near passage shook the South.

The next time the poll tax was taken up in the House, in May 1943, southern members accused organized labor of being the nefarious behind-the-scenes actor stimulating support for the legislation. This meddling, Mississippi's Jamie Whitten cautioned, will "make it much more difficult for us who consider ourselves liberals in the South as we struggle to free the poor people in the South and admit them to the economic life of the region and to a participation in its political processes."³³ Such anti-labor demonology was stimulated by the multiracial character of many (especially CIO) unions, their support of civil rights bills, and by the wartime growth in southern labor union membership.

During the 1930s, trade unions began to make inroads in the South, with the establishment of significant labor strongholds in a number of industries, including meat packing, oil refining, the docks, and metal mining, as well as steel and coal. Nonetheless, compared to the rest of the country, the growth of the CIO in the South was relatively modest. Southern union membership remained concentrated mainly in AFL unions and railway brotherhoods. By decade's end, the AFL had fewer than 400,000 southern members, and the CIO had done poorly as well, with under 150,000 members, plus another 100,000 miners in West Virginia. In the newer industries of automobile, rubber, and oil production, where the federation had great success elsewhere, it managed to enroll fewer than 25,000 southerners.

Against this backdrop, World War II had a galvanizing impact. Southern manufacturing jobs grew from 1,657,000 at the outbreak of the war to 2,836,000 at the wartime peak in 1943.³⁴ With a newly tight labor market and with the

³³ *Congressional Record*, House of Representatives, 25 May 1943, 4883.

protection and encouragement provided by the Fair Employment Practices Committee and the National War Labor Board, union organizing became easier and wage differentials between blacks and whites grew less stark. Signs of bracing and threatening change now could be found in the most unlikely places. The Textile Workers Union of America, a CIO affiliate, succeeded in organizing the immense Dan River, Virginia plant; this, the country's largest cotton mill, had been the site of many bitter defeats. By the end of the war, one in six members of the population of Gadsden, Alabama belonged to a CIO union.³⁴ To be sure, these various union gains should not be exaggerated. When World War II concluded, there were still considerable gaps between North and South; in 1946, only 20 percent of the South's workers in textile plants, the region's largest industry, were in unions compared with 70 percent in the North. But the direction of change and the potential for union gains in the future challenged the isolation of the southern labor market and provoked southerners in Congress to battle organized labor.³⁵

Under these conditions, the anxieties of southern representatives heightened, and the tacit understandings that had governed southern-New Deal relations with respect to votes on labor during the New Deal Congresses could not be sustained. Southern members now adamantly refused to support pro-labor bills, and they began to vote to restrict the newly secured rights of unions. In this second period, the fault line between the South and the rest of the Democratic party widened as labor market and race relations trends and issues conjoined.

If conservative coalitional voting with the Republicans now became characteristic of southern behavior on labor roll calls, the extent and depth of Democratic party cohesion in the other policy areas should not be gainsaid. During the wartime and postwar Congresses there were no issues apart from civil rights and labor where the likeness scores of southern and nonsouthern Democrats dipped below the high threshold of 70. In votes on the welfare state, regulation, planning, and fiscal matters, cross-regional Democratic similarity remained remarkably high.

POSTWAR LIBERALISM

How should we judge V. O. Key's rejection, apart from race, of Richard Hofstadter's charge that the South composed a reactionary faction? Hofstadter was too expansive in his portrayal of what he called southern conservatism, but Key too narrowly limited the southern veto to civil rights by failing to recognize the special significance of labor questions.

³⁴ This discussion draws on F. Ray Marshall, *Labor in the South* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 182-243.

³⁵ Union successes during the war motivated many southern states to pass constitutionally dubious legislation to restrict them. These initiatives were unenforceable in light of provisions of the Wagner Act, but they did set a precedent for right to work laws passed by the various states under the protective umbrella of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act. During the war many southern states also passed laws requiring the registration of unions. See *ibid.*, 241-243.

TABLE 6

Congressional Coalitions by Policy and Period, 1933–1950: Index of Likeness Scores

Congress	Policy	Southern Democrats and Republicans	Southern Democrats and Nonsouthern Democrats	Nonsouthern Democrats and Republicans
New Deal	Civil rights	35	40	65
	Fiscal	18	98	16
	Planning	31	92	26
	Regulation	47	94	47
	Welfare state	40	93	44
	Labor	69	70	40
	All votes	45	79	44
Wartime	Civil rights	32	41	79
	Fiscal	31	92	40
	Planning	51	89	48
	Regulation	77	90	78
	Welfare state	61	79	51
	Labor	77	48	51
	All votes	55	68	58
Postwar	Civil rights	29	32	70
	Fiscal	49	87	36
	Planning	60	87	46
	Regulation	46	73	28
	Welfare state	59	76	35
	Labor	74	54	33
	All votes	56	64	41

After the successive crises of the Great Depression and World War II, relationships between the state and the economy and between the state and its citizens were redesigned in most western countries within the framework of a new international political economy in the hope that formulas could be discovered to combine liberty and prosperity, democracy and capitalism. This burst of institutional creativity sought effective space between the classical liberal order that had collapsed and the anti-liberal formulas of fascism and communism. It drew on a finite repertoire of options for the organization of markets and the definition of citizenship under the rubrics of planning, regulation, the welfare state, fiscal and monetary policy, corporatism, and representation by different types of interest groups and political parties. So, too, in the United States. In this period, the complex and diverse legacies of the New Deal were sorted out in a context of massively enhanced state capacity. In the Untied States, the war had provoked a fiscal revolution and bureaucratic growth to create a potent central state apparatus; abroad, the United States was incontestably dominant in economic and geopolitical affairs. In this setting, the United States possessed a range of plausible alternatives for constructing ties between the state, economy, and society.

The period's European social democratic movements privileged the linkage between left-wing political parties and unions. They promoted policy formulas that permitted labor movements to trade the costs of austere wage gains for recognition by and within the state as a fundamental social class and for politically guaranteed social benefits. In the United States, the Democratic party in the 1940s proved incapable of brokering this kind of social democratic bargain. As a consequence, a labor movement that appeared to aspire to the status of such arrangements in the late 1930s and early 1940s reduced its ambitions to those of an interest group (albeit a very important one) in national politics. It pushed for expansive fiscal policies to underpin the collective bargaining goals of securing high wages and strong fringe benefit packages in lieu of a social wage, an integrated labor market, incentives to organize the unorganized, and an institutionalized corporatist role. In the near term, at a time of American economic hegemony and of robust growth in large manufacturing industries, labor prospered. In longer perspective, it is now clear that the place crafted for labor in the 1940s has produced a fateful, perhaps fatal contraction for the labor movement.

"The American Liberal today," D. W. Brogan observed in 1957 from the distance of Cambridge University, "is confronted first of all by the memory of something that did not happen": the development of coherent social democratic programs and organizations. Elsewhere in the West, he observed, the democratic Left had created parties committed to strong political control over capitalist development, labor movements insistent on being recognized on a par with business in corporatist bargaining structures, and coalitions of workers and farmers as bases of political mobilization. The American situation was different in each respect. "The American Liberal has not enough belief in the state to want it to run the economy or in the businessman to want him to run it uncontrolled." The labor movement had reduced the scope of its national political ambitions, and, instead, was giving priority to aggressive collective bargaining in large industries; "the powerful unions have largely contracted out of the state system." And a potential alliance between workers and farmers was distorted by sectionalism and race. "Here," Brogan noted, "the Liberal conscience is most deeply touched and his political behavior seems (to the unfriendly outsider) most schizophrenic. The representative Liberal is a Democrat, or an ally of the Democrats, but in the ranks of 'the Democracy' are most of the most violent enemies of the integration of the Negro into the American community. This is no doubt accidental; it arises from the localization of the most acute form of the colour problem in the region where the Democratic party is traditionally strongest. The necessity for holding the party together makes for strange bedfellows and strange deals."³⁶

Focusing on these strange bedfellows and strange deals has proved helpful to understanding why in the late 1940s the American labor movement turned away from the public realm and why the Democratic party was able to coalesce in

³⁶ D. W. Brogan, "American Liberalism Today" in H. C. Allen and C. P. Hill, eds., *British Essays in American History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957), 320, 323, 326.

support of a liberal but not a social democratic program. The key to both traits was the Democratic party's inability to find a politically acceptable role for the labor movement as a national policy actor. The disappearance of southern tolerance for policies to promote labor organization and develop a national framework for labor markets impelled the more social democratic American options to the political periphery. Instead, the excision of labor thrust the combination of relatively noninterventionist fiscal policies and interest group pluralism to the political center.

The contours of postwar American politics and the unrealized social democratic tendencies of the New Deal and Fair Deal have been accounted for by most scholars either by invoking durable features of American political development, such as the constraints of Lockean ideology and institutional fragmentation and the limits these have imposed on an activist state, or by short-term situational analyses of such matters as presidential tactics or the results of this or that congressional election. By elaborating on what Hofstadter called the southern veto, we have highlighted a critical factor accounting for the resolution of the period's options: the limited place for labor in the American postwar settlement. Our approach thus joins two quite different time lines by exploring how the division between North and South that has been so fundamental in American history became an integral part of the encounter between competing visions of how the state should be linked to the society and to the economy during and especially after the New Deal. In joining structural and contingent elements, our account treats purely situational and ad hoc approaches as inadequate and rejects the idea that all roads in American history necessarily led to the postwar reassertion of American exceptionalism.

The South's veto, we discovered, neither was an all-inclusive rejection of liberalism in favor of conservatism, nor was it limited to questions of civil rights. Rather, the choices made by southern Democrats in the issue area of labor account not only for why the Democratic party's social democratic impulses were thwarted and the importance of the labor movement in politics reduced in scope; but they also provide a basis for understanding why the party was able to find a coherent policy stance of the kind described by Brogan. The South's veto did more than divide the Democratic party from time to time. It also specified the basis on which a party alliance could be forged. If the South was prepared to block the national party on some issues, principally those that concerned race and labor, solidarity between the regions nonetheless could be achieved on terms more acceptable to the South. By discovering just such common ground, the Democratic party in the 1940s defined the landscape and moral geography of postwar American liberalism.*

* This article is part of the project, "Setting the Social Welfare Policy Agenda," funded by the Ford Foundation, grant 850-1012, at the Center for Politics, Theory, and Policy, The Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research. We are indebted for their written comments on an earlier draft to Richard Bensel, Demetrios Caraley, Lizabeth Cohen, Michael Goldfield, Cathy O'Leary, and Robert Y. Shapiro, and for useful advice to Charles Stewart III.

APPENDIX

Date	Bill No.	Category	Subject
4/21/33	H.R. 4606	H Social welfare	Expand work-relief eligibility
4/25/33	H.R. 5081	H Planning	TVA
5/17/33	H.R. 5081	H Planning	TVA/Conference Report
5/26/33	H.R. 5755	H Planning	NIRA
6/8/33	H.R. 5755	S Labor	Limit implications of NIRA
6/9/33	H.R. 5755	S Planning	NIRA
5/4/34	H.R. 9323	H Regulation	Regulate securities market/S.E.C.
5/12/34	S. 3420	S Regulation	Regulate securities market/S.E.C.
3/21/35	H.J.R. 117	S Regulation	Restores antitrust laws under NIRA
4/19/35	H.R. 7260	H Social welfare	Social Security Act
4/19/35	H.R. 7260	H Social welfare	Social Security Act/increase appropriations
4/26/35	S. 24	S Race	Anti-Lynching Bill
5/1/35	S. 24	S Race	Anti-Lynching Bill/to adjourn
5/9/35	H.R. 7617	H Regulation	Regulate banking
5/16/35	H.R. 1958	S Labor	Wagner Act/add anti-intimidation clause
6/7/35	S.J.R. 113	H Planning	Transfer NIRA powers to FTC
6/7/35	S.J.R. 113	H Planning	Extend NIRA
6/11/35	S. 2796	S Regulation	Public Utilities Holding Act/"death sentence"
6/11/35	S. 2796	S Regulation	Public Utilities Holding Act/divestment procedure
6/11/35	S. 2796	S Regulation	Public Utilities Holding Act/passage
6/19/35	H.R. 7260	S Social welfare	Social Security Act
7/2/35	S. 2796	H Regulation	Public Utilities Holding Act/enacting clause
7/2/35	S. 2796	H Regulation	Public Utilities Holding Act/recommittal
7/2/35	S. 2796	H Regulation	Public Utilities Holding Act/passage
8/24/35	S. 2796	H Regulation	Public Utilities Holding Act/conference report
4/5/37	H.R. 4985	S Labor	Disapprove of sit-down strikes
4/12/37	H.R. 125	H Race	Anti-Lynching Bill/to discharge from Rules Committee
4/15/37	H.R. 1507	H Race	Anti-Lynching Bill
5/12/37	H.R. 6551	H Social welfare	Expand CCC eligibility
7/31/37	S. 2475	S Labor	Fair Labor Standards Act/recommittal
7/31/37	S. 2475	S Race	Amend Fair Labor Standards Act/Anti-Lynching
7/31/37	S. 2475	S Labor	Fair Labor Standards Act/passage
8/13/37	H.R. 8202	H Social welfare	Create Department of Welfare
12/17/37	S. 2475	H Labor	Fair Labor Standards Act/recommittal
1/27/38	H.R. 1507	S Race	Anti-Lynching Bill/to impose cloture
2/16/38	H.R. 1507	S Race	Anti-Lynching Bill/to impose cloture
5/24/38	S. 2475	H Labor	Fair Labor Standards Act/recommittal
5/24/38	S. 2475	H Labor	Fair Labor Standards Act/passage
6/1/38	H.J.R. 679	S Planning	National Resources Committee/increase appropriations
6/2/38	H.J. Res. 679	S Fiscal	Increase work relief appropriations
6/14/38	S. 2475	H Labor	Fair Labor Standards Act/conference report
3/31/39	H.J.R. 246	H Social welfare	Reduce work relief appropriations
7/10/39	H.R. 6635	H Social welfare	Liberalize SSI benefits
7/11/39	H.R. 6635	S Social welfare	Increase welfare appropriations
7/11/39	H.R. 6635	S Social welfare	Increase Social Security appropriations
7/12/39	H.R. 6635	S Social welfare	Encourage states to provide old-age benefits
7/13/39	H.R. 6635	S Social welfare	Mandate states to provide minimum old-age benefits
7/26/39	S. 2009	H Regulation	Unify ICC regulations/recommittal

continue

APPENDIX, *continued*

Date	Bill No.	Category	Subject
7/28/39	S. 2864	S Social welfare	Extend work-relief eligibility
1/10/40	H.R. 801	H Race	Anti-Lynching Bill
2/6/40	H.R. 7922	S Planning	National Resources Committee/decrease appropriations
2/6/40	H.R. 7922	S Planning	National Resources Committee/appropriation
3/28/40	H.R. 9007	H Social welfare	Increase appropriations for NYA
4/12/40	H.R. 7922	H Planning	National Resources Committee/increase appropriations
5/9/40	S. 2009	H Regulation	Unify ICC regulations/recommittal/reduce rates
5/27/40	S. 1970	S Labor	Eliminate oppressive labor practices
6/7/40	H.R. 9195	H Labor	Amend NLRA/weaken board and enforcement
6/19/40	H.R. 10039	S Fiscal	Reduce government expenses
8/26/40	S. 4164	S Race	Prohibit discrimination in draft
9/7/40	H.R. 10132	H Planning	Require firms to produce war materiel
1/31/41	H.R. 2788	H Fiscal	Reduce government appropriations
5/19/41	H.R. 2476	S Regulation	Reduce antitrust enforcement appropriations
6/13/41	H.J.R. 193	H Social welfare	Extend work-relief eligibility
6/19/41	H.J.R. 193	S Labor	Prevent centralization of work relief administration
7/10/41	S. 1524	H Labor	National defense labor disputes/strike arbitration
8/5/41	S. 1579	H Planning	Presidential requisition of war materiel
11/28/41	H.R. 5990	H Planning	Price controls
12/3/41	H.R. 4139	H Labor	Amend Vinson Anti-Strike/restrict right to strike
1/27/42	H.R. 5990	S Planning	Price controls
4/7/42	H.R. 6868	S Regulation	Strike profit limit on Defense contracts
6/11/42	H.J.R. 324	H Social welfare	Limit relief appropriations/share burden with states
6/26/42	H.R. 7181	S Social welfare	Continue CCC appropriations
6/30/42	H.R. 7181	H Social welfare	Continue CCC appropriations
8/25/42	H.R. 7416	S Race	Armed Forces absentee voting in primaries
8/25/42	H.R. 7416	S Race	Prohibit poll tax in Army absentee voting
9/30/42	S.J.R. 161	S Planning	Wage and price controls
10/13/42	H.R. 1024	H Race	Prohibit poll tax in presidential voting
11/23/42	H.R. 1024	S Race	Anti-Poll Tax Bill/to impose cloture
5/4/43	S. 796	S Labor	War labor disputes/restrict executive control over
5/5/43	S. 796	S Labor	War labor disputes/strengthen WLB
5/25/43	H.R. 7	H Race	Anti-Poll Tax Bill
5/27/43	H.R. 1762	S Planning	Nat'l Resources Planning Board/increase appropriations
5/27/43	H.R. 1762	S Planning	Nat'l Resources Planning Board/decrease appropriations
6/4/43	S. 796	H Labor	War labor disputes/Labor Dept. certifies strike
6/4/43	S. 796	H Labor	War labor disputes/Gov't operates plants
6/18/43	H.R. 2968	H Planning	Only businessmen in OPA
6/25/43	S. 796	S Labor	War labor disputes/override veto
6/28/43	H.R. 2935	H Social welfare	Continue NYA appropriations
7/1/43	H.R. 2935	H Social welfare	Expand NYA eligibility
10/20/43	S. 637	S Race	Prohibit discrimination in spending of fed. education funds
1/18/44	H.R. 3687	S Fiscal	Restrict mineral depletion allowances
3/24/44	H.R. 4070	S Race	Retain FEPC funding
5/15/44	H.R. 7	S Race	Anti-Poll Tax Bill/to impose cloture
6/20/44	H.R. 4879	S Race	Strike FEPC funding
6/20/44	H.R. 4879	S Race	Provide for FEPC appeals
6/20/44	H.R. 4879	S Race	Limit black FEPC employment

continued

APPENDIX, *continued*

Date	Bill No.	Category	Subject
3/13/45	H.R. 1984	S Planning	Public Works planning/increase appropriations
6/11/45	S.J.R. 30	S Planning	Extend price control
6/12/45	H.R. 7	H Race	Anti-Poll Tax Bill
6/26/45	H.R. 3199	S Labor	USES/increase appropriations
6/28/45	S.J.R. 30	S Planning	Extend price control
6/30/45	H.R. 3368	S Race	Retain FEPC funding
6/30/45	S.J.R. 30	H Planning	Extend price control
9/19/45	S. 1274	S Labor	USES/return uses to states
9/28/45	S. 380	S Fiscal	Full Employment Act
12/11/45	H.R. 407	H Labor	Consider repeal of War Labor Disputes Act
1/29/46	H.R. 4437	H Labor	USES/return uses to states
2/6/46	S. 380	H Fiscal	Full Employment Act/conference report
2/7/46	H.R. 4908	H Labor	Fact-finding boards in labor disputes
2/21/46	H.R. 3370	H Race	Prohibit lunch funds to segregated schools
2/26/46	S. 962	S Social welfare	Reduce school lunch program appropriations
3/6/46	H.R. 4761	H Regulation	Regulate real estate speculation
6/25/46	H.R. 4437	S Labor	USES/disallow fed. operation of state USES offices
6/25/46	H.R. 4437	S Labor	USES/disallow fed. discretion over USES
7/1/46	H.J.R. 371	H Planning	Extend price control
7/12/46	H.J.R. 371	S Planning	Extend price control
8/1/46	H.J.R. 390	S Social welfare	Reduce FSA maternal and child appropriations
3/21/47	H.R. 2157	S Labor	Increase minimum wage
5/7/47	S. 1126	S Labor	Taft-Hartley/restrict industry-wide bargaining
5/8/47	S. 1126	S Labor	Taft-Hartley/oversight of union welfare funds
5/9/47	S. 1126	S Labor	Taft-Hartley/strike closed shop provisions from NLRA
6/17/47	H.R. 1	H Fiscal	Override veto on Tax Reduction Bill
6/20/47	H.R. 2030	H Labor	Taft-Hartley/override veto
6/23/47	H.R. 2030	S Labor	Taft-Hartley/override veto
6/30/47	H.C.R. 49	S Labor	Reorganization Plan No. 2/transfer USES to Labor
7/12/47	H.R. 3950	S Fiscal	Cyclic tax planning
7/21/47	H.R. 29	H Race	Anti-Poll Tax Bill
12/18/47	S.J.R. 167	S Regulation	Strike exemptions from antitrust laws
2/24/48	S. 2182	S Regulation	Remove rent controls in certain areas
3/16/48	S. 2182	S Regulation	Rent controls/strike enacting clause
3/16/48	H.C.R. 131	S Labor	Reorganization Plan No. 1/transfer USES to Labor
6/7/48	S. 2655	S Race	Exempt servicemen from poll tax
8/4/48	H.R. 29	S Race	Anti-Poll Tax Bill/to adjourn
3/22/49	H.R. 1731	S Regulation	Allow cities to decontrol rents
4/21/49	S. 1070	S Planning	Public housing projects' referenda
4/21/49	S. 1070	S Race	Prohibit discrimination in public housing
6/30/49	S. 249	S Labor	Subordinate state labor law to federal
7/26/49	H.R. 3199	H Race	Anti-Poll Tax Bill
7/27/49	H.R. 4177	S Fiscal	Increase BoB appropriations
7/27/49	H.R. 4177	S Fiscal	Increase CEA appropriations
8/16/49	S.R. 147	S Social welfare	Reject creation of Dept. of Welfare
8/17/49	S.R. 151	S Labor	Disapprove transfer of USES to Labor
8/30/49	S. 653	S Labor	Minimum wage exemptions
9/29/49	H.R. 1689	S Fiscal	Balance budget by 1950

continued

APPENDIX, *continued*

<i>Date</i>	<i>Bill No.</i>	<i>Category</i>	<i>Subject</i>
10/3/49	S. 2116	H Planning	Public Works Planning
10/14/49	S. 1000	H Regulation	FTC/recommittal
2/23/50	H.R. 4453	H Race	Prohibit employment discrimination
6/12/50	S. 3181	S Regulation	Extend rent controls
6/20/50	H.R. 6000	S Social welfare	Include needy disabled under Social Security
8/21/50	S. 3936	S Planning	Price and wage controls